17th century philosophers were not in a position to understand the mind as well as we can today, since the advent of experimental methods in psychology. It shows no disrespect for the brilliance of Descartes or Kant to acknowledge that… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say that I don't directly discuss the work of those philosophers who would disagree.) But even if we grant this, many will argue that scientific knowledge in humans, and, indeed, reflective knowledge in general, is quite different… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better view of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about the relevance of empirical work to philosophy, a good deal of their work is devoted to understanding features of our folk concepts, and in this respect, at least, I see them as making the same mistake… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the real ground for confidence that we are in a position to gain knowledge of the world around us. At the same time, one might ask how it is that the cognitive equipment we have came about,… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When I got to college, I planned to be a math major, and, in addition to signing up for some math courses, I decided to take some philosophy. Quite by chance, I took a philosophy of science course in which the entire semester was devoted to reading Locke's Essay. I was hooked. For the next few semesters, I took nothing… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined. — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief is justified must somehow be internal to the agent. On some views, this amounts to the claim that these features must be accessible to introspection and armchair reflection. On others, it amounts only to the claim… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
