By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
My own reasons for favouring talk of natural kinds is just that I believe the best accounts of the success of scientific… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I believe, that empirically informed approaches to the question have issued in more illuminating answers than the old armchair approaches. But I… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I largely defer to the cognitive ethologists. I believe that the arguments that they make on this score are extremely persuasive. More… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
It started becoming clear to me how one might have views about the nature of mind and of knowledge which are empirically… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I am concerned about epistemic normativity, and I don't think that it is just a hangover from a priori and armchair approaches.… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
In my view, philosophers have shown a great deal more respect for the first-person point of view than it deserves. There's a… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better view of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When I got to college, I planned to be a math major, and, in addition to signing up for some math courses, I decided… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined. — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
