The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable.… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
What we need to do, however, is figure out what our best available theories of the mind suggest about epistemological issues, while… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Epistemologists should be concerned with knowledge and justification and so on, not our concepts of them; philosophers of mind should be concerned… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I do think that an understanding of contemporary work in the cognitive sciences has a profound effect on how one views the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
17th century philosophers were not in a position to understand the mind as well as we can today, since the advent of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
It started becoming clear to me how one might have views about the nature of mind and of knowledge which are empirically… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Work on causal theories of knowledge - early work by Armstrong, and Dretske, and Goldman - seemed far more satisfying. As I… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The great philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries did not think that epistemological questions floated free of questions about how the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better view of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When I got to college, I planned to be a math major, and, in addition to signing up for some math courses, I decided… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined. — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
