I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Bealer has a number of reasons for thinking that a naturalistic epistemology is self-undermining. Let me focus on one of these. (I've… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When we recognise that reflective processes are no more outside the causal net than unreflective processes, and that they are bound by… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
What I argue is that talk of knowledge plays an important role in theories within cognitive ethology. The idea is this. First,… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When I first began studying philosophy, a good deal of what went on in analytic epistemology was focused on addressing the Gettier… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
There has certainly been a great deal of work addressing the relationship between naturalism and the first-person perspective. Quite a number of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
In my view, philosophers have shown a great deal more respect for the first-person point of view than it deserves. There's a… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better view of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When I got to college, I planned to be a math major, and, in addition to signing up for some math courses, I decided… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined. — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
