I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I do realise that talk of natural kinds dates back to Aristotle, but I'd better not say too much about ancient philosophers… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Here, there is simply no substitute for the kind of work that experimental psychologists do, work which shows some mechanisms to be… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
My own reasons for favouring talk of natural kinds is just that I believe the best accounts of the success of scientific… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
What I hankered for was an account of knowledge which would do far more than get our intuitions about cases right; I… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
In my view, since the case can be made that knowledge too is a natural kind, the role of pretheoretical intuitions is… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I have made some headway in addressing these questions, however, and succeeded in explaining how it is that the category of knowledge… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When I first began studying philosophy, a good deal of what went on in analytic epistemology was focused on addressing the Gettier… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I argue is that philosophers have had a tendency to present a kind of mystical view of the powers of reflection. Unreflective… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Talk of belief in these animals is not some kind of anthropomorphism. We simply cannot explain the kinds of problem solving and… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
For one thing, I think that there are questions which philosophers raise which, although science bears on them, are not typically the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The kinds of claims I make about knowledge are thus meant to be illustrative of a general argumentative strategy which might well… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Bealer argues that the kind of naturalistic view which Quine holds will rob him of the ability to make the normative claims… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
No one worries terribly much about who the questions belong to, or whether a given contribution is really philosophy or, instead, properly… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
If we want to make sense of the possibility of successful inductive inference, and if we want to explain the possibility of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better view of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When I got to college, I planned to be a math major, and, in addition to signing up for some math courses, I decided… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined. — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
