Chance Quote by Hilary Kornblith

I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just…

— Hilary Kornblith

The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say…

— Hilary Kornblith

I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like…

— Hilary Kornblith

The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better view of…

— Hilary Kornblith

Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some…

— Hilary Kornblith

The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about…

— Hilary Kornblith

The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the…

— Hilary Kornblith

By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first…

— Hilary Kornblith

The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my…

— Hilary Kornblith

When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined.

— Hilary Kornblith

Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief…

— Hilary Kornblith

What we need to do, however, is figure out what our best available theories of the mind suggest about epistemological issues, while we recognise…

— Hilary Kornblith