Economics Quote by Erik Brynjolfsson
““Holmstrom and P. Milgrom, “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 7, no. 24 (1991).””
About This Quote
Source Journal Article: “Multitask Principal‑Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 1991
The paper examines how contracts, ownership structures, and job design affect incentives when agents perform multiple tasks.
In simple terms: Contracts and ownership shape incentives for multiple tasks.
Key Takeaway
Design incentives that align with all tasks.
Themes
economics
organization
incentives
principal‑agent
contract design
Mood
analytical
critical
Type
academic
theoretical
When to use this quote
- corporate governance
- policy making
- academic research
Key Concepts
multitask incentives
asset ownership
job design
Questions to Reflect On
- How can firms balance incentives across diverse responsibilities?
- What ownership structures best support multitasking?
A Different Perspective
Complex real‑world tasks may not fit simple contract models.
