Philosophers need not much use the word 'intuition' or the concept of intuition, except when they happen to be working on the epistemology of the a priori. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Philosophers do need to have intuitions of various specific sorts: ethical, metaphysical, etc., depending on their targeted subject matter. And they must make intuition reports, as they record the contents of their intuitions. But they need not go into whether… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Philosophers need not much use the word 'intuition' or the concept of intuition, except when they happen to be working on the epistemology of… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
When you dream, your perceptual (and other) competence is affected. You are then unable to get it right competently with the beliefs in your… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Ultimately, my more significant agreement is with a virtue tradition that features Aristotle and Descartes. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
It is bad to want something that not even God could attain, especially when the impossibility becomes obvious. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
I am mainly concerned with unqualified knowledge, by contrast with the varieties of expert knowledge: scientific knowledge of various sorts, legal knowledge, medically expert… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
If a shot aimed at aptness succeeds aptly, it is then fully apt, since it is not only apt but also aptly apt. But… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
It is also certain that when we assent to some piece of reasoning when our perception of it is lacking, then either we go… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
We need some standard that will determine how likely a belief is to be true given just that it is stored in one of… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Descartes's epistemology is a special case of Aristotle's virtue ethics. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Success is better than failure; an attempt is a better attempt, it is better as an attempt, if competent than if incompetent; and it… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Judgment is affirmation with the intention to thereby affirm competently enough, and indeed aptly. That distinguishes judgments from mere guesses. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
