The relevant features of scientific practice often have mundane explanations which don't point to any deep metaphysical moral. (Thus it would simply be messy and pointless for the chemists to essay physical reductions, or for the biologists to offer number-free… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I'm not so sure that I am a reductionist in the strict type-identity sense. The issues here are messy. But I certainly a reductionist in the more general sense which is opposed to eliminativism and dualism. — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Nearly everybody nowadays accepts the 'causal completeness of physics' - every physical event (or at least its probability) has a full physical cause. This… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
My first degree was in mathematics. That was great, but it didn't help with many of the things that puzzled me. I became a… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
If there is such a simple argument for physicalism, how come everybody hasn't always been a physicalist? That's a good question, and there is… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Kripke says that physicalists like me can't explain the 'apparent contingency' of mind-brain identities. He maintains that, if I really believed that pains are… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
A certain kind of methodologically-minded philosopher of science is quick to read off metaphysical conclusions from features of scientific practice. Chemists don't derive their… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend what can… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspection.… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Again, when we view a scene fleetingly, do we consciously see all the details even though we don't retain them, or do we not… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Everybody agrees that a future in which you are dead is a very bad thing, and that it isn't made any better by your… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need to know… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
In truth a clear-headed physicalist shouldn't be thinking any of these dualist thoughts. If pains are one and the same as C-fibres firing, then… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
The use of neuroscientific data to help resolve phenomenological questions is proving a common theme in much contemporary thinking about the mind. How rich… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
