The orthodox view of colour experience assumes that, when we see a colour difference between two surfaces viewed side-by-side, this is because… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
The use of neuroscientific data to help resolve phenomenological questions is proving a common theme in much contemporary thinking about the mind.… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
There is a brain mechanism that works to identify colour differences directly, without first identifying the absolute colour of each surface. So… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
If neuroscientific research shows that those mechanisms only contain comparative information about colour differences, and have 'thrown away' more fine-grained information about… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I don't think that we are capable of anything like this many possible colour responses. Instead I argue that the perception of… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I rather incline towards 'conceptualism', in line with my view of colour perception - I don't think that we can represent objects… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
After all, in supporting phenomenal concepts I am in a sense siding with introspection against the more behaviourist Wittgensteinians. But even so… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Nearly everybody nowadays accepts the 'causal completeness of physics' - every physical event (or at least its probability) has a full physical cause. This… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
My first degree was in mathematics. That was great, but it didn't help with many of the things that puzzled me. I became a… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
If there is such a simple argument for physicalism, how come everybody hasn't always been a physicalist? That's a good question, and there is… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Kripke says that physicalists like me can't explain the 'apparent contingency' of mind-brain identities. He maintains that, if I really believed that pains are… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
A certain kind of methodologically-minded philosopher of science is quick to read off metaphysical conclusions from features of scientific practice. Chemists don't derive their… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend what can… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspection.… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Again, when we view a scene fleetingly, do we consciously see all the details even though we don't retain them, or do we not… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
Everybody agrees that a future in which you are dead is a very bad thing, and that it isn't made any better by your… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need to know… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
In truth a clear-headed physicalist shouldn't be thinking any of these dualist thoughts. If pains are one and the same as C-fibres firing, then… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
The use of neuroscientific data to help resolve phenomenological questions is proving a common theme in much contemporary thinking about the mind. How rich… — David Papineau Copy Share Image
