The success of an archery shot may bring food to the hunter's starving family, or may constitute a horrible murder. But these outcomes are irrelevant to the assessment of that shot as a hunter-archery shot, as an attempt to hit… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Philosophers need not much use the word 'intuition' or the concept of intuition, except when they happen to be working on the epistemology of… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
When you dream, your perceptual (and other) competence is affected. You are then unable to get it right competently with the beliefs in your… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Ultimately, my more significant agreement is with a virtue tradition that features Aristotle and Descartes. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
It is bad to want something that not even God could attain, especially when the impossibility becomes obvious. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
I am mainly concerned with unqualified knowledge, by contrast with the varieties of expert knowledge: scientific knowledge of various sorts, legal knowledge, medically expert… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
If a shot aimed at aptness succeeds aptly, it is then fully apt, since it is not only apt but also aptly apt. But the full aptness of such an attempt is entirely compatible with its being a horrible murder, if the "hunter" is an assassin and the prey his victim. That hunter's shot may still be outstandingly, fully apt,… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share
It is also certain that when we assent to some piece of reasoning when our perception of it is lacking, then either we go… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
We need some standard that will determine how likely a belief is to be true given just that it is stored in one of… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Descartes's epistemology is a special case of Aristotle's virtue ethics. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Success is better than failure; an attempt is a better attempt, it is better as an attempt, if competent than if incompetent; and it… — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
Judgment is affirmation with the intention to thereby affirm competently enough, and indeed aptly. That distinguishes judgments from mere guesses. — Ernest Sosa Copy Share Image
