Ho Chi Minh was well aware that the enemy possessed more firepower than did his own forces, and sought to use what he viewed as the superior political and moral position of his own revolutionary movement as a trump card… — William J. Duiker Copy Share
When the advice of Moscow ran counter to [Ho Chi Minh's] own ideas - as in the 1930s - he kept his head down and waited until the situation changed in his favor with the beginning of the Pacific War. — William J. Duiker Copy Share Image
In the end, many of his more militant colleagues began to feel that [Ho Chi Minh's] tendency to compromise, and his reluctance to confront… — William J. Duiker Copy Share Image
There were various aspects of Sun Tzu's approach that appealed to Ho Chi Minh: a) to learn to understand both the enemy and yourself, to seek out his weaknesses and your own strengths, and act accordingly, b) to make ample use of subterfuge and stratagem in order to defeat or disarm your adversary, and c) to use outright violence only… — William J. Duiker Copy Share
None of Ho Chi Minh's colleagues was as dedicated to the use of political struggle, psychological warfare, and diplomatic means as he was. — William J. Duiker Copy Share Image
From the outset, when [Ho Chi Minh] became a member of the French Communist Party in 1920, he was an independent thinker who adjusted Marxist-Leninist ideas and tactics to what he perceived to be the concrete situation in Indochina. — William J. Duiker Copy Share
The influence of Sun Tzu on other North Vietnamese military strategists is harder to answer. Certainly many of the key leaders in Hanoi were aware of Sun Tzu and made use of his ideas - Vo Nguyen Giap applied many of these ideas in seeking out weak elements in the enemy's defenses, as did Truong Chinh, whose famous treatise, The… — William J. Duiker Copy Share
[Dissidents] groups would benefit enormously from learning about Ho Chi Minh's ideas on how to defeat a more popular enemy. — William J. Duiker Copy Share Image
If [Ho Chi Minh] had had carte blanche over his movement, would the results of the war have been different? That is difficult to say. In some cases - as in 1945 and 1946, he appeared to overestimate the possibility that the United States might decide to recognize his government and the independence of the DRV (although to be fair,… — William J. Duiker Copy Share
Finally, in 1954 [Ho Chi Minh] agreed to the Geneva Agreement, which divided the country temporarily into two zones, in the hope that national… — William J. Duiker Copy Share Image
Ho Chi Minh was well aware that the enemy possessed more firepower than did his own forces, and sought to use what he viewed as the superior political and moral position of his own revolutionary movement as a trump card to defeat a well-armed adversary. These ideas were originally generated during his early years as a revolutionary in the 1920s… — William J. Duiker Copy Share
On many occasions in the late 1950s and 1960s, [Ho Chi Minh's] ideas were apparently ignored by those who felt that his approach was too naive and prone to compromise. The outbreak of open warfare with the French and later with the United States was in effect a sign of the failure of Ho Chi Minh to achieve his objective… — William J. Duiker Copy Share
I decided that after returning to the US to pursue an academic career I would eventually study the life of Ho Chi Minh to… — William J. Duiker Copy Share Image
Ho Chi Minh preferred to use the tactics of negotiation and compromise, primarily because of his recognition that the revolutionary movement was militarily weaker… — William J. Duiker Copy Share Image
![“When the advice of Moscow ran counter to [Ho Chi Minh's] own ideas - as in the 1930s - he kept his head down and waited until the situation changed in his favor with the beginning of the Pacific War.” quote by William J. Duiker](https://sms4smile.com/quotes/img-quotes/c64/william-j-duiker-21821_1930s_when-the-advice-of-moscow-ran-counter-to_3059969.jpg)
![“In the end, many of his more militant colleagues began to feel that [Ho Chi Minh's] tendency to compromise, and his reluctance to confront the enemy directly, was a sign of weakness. The decision to confront the United States in 1963-1965 was a tacit recognition that Ho's approach had failed.” quote by William J. Duiker](https://sms4smile.com/quotes/img-quotes/064/william-j-duiker-21821_approach_in-the-end-many-of-his-more-militant-col_40669.jpg)
![“[Dissidents] groups would benefit enormously from learning about Ho Chi Minh's ideas on how to defeat a more popular enemy.” quote by William J. Duiker](https://sms4smile.com/quotes/img-quotes/f7c/william-j-duiker-21821_benefits_dissidents-groups-would-benefit-enormous_627793.jpg)
![“Finally, in 1954 [Ho Chi Minh] agreed to the Geneva Agreement, which divided the country temporarily into two zones, in the hope that national elections might unify the country under his leadership.” quote by William J. Duiker](https://sms4smile.com/quotes/img-quotes/abe/william-j-duiker-21821_agreement_finally-in-1954-ho-chi-minh-agreed-to-th_798642.jpg)
