The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C. — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Much of the conventional wisdom associated with Vietnam was highly inaccurate. Far from an inevitable result of the imperative to contain communism, the war… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
We confuse activity with progress, and that's always dangerous, especially in war. — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
What is certain about the future is that even the best efforts to predict the conditions of future war will prove erroneous. What is… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
We often operate effectively on the physical battleground but not on the psychological battleground. We fail to communicate our resolve. — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Consequences of linear thinking in Afghanistan and Iraq included overestimating indigenous forces' capabilities, underestimating the enemy, and the associated expectation that the coalition could… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Bombing, particularly from the perspective of the receiving end, is not 'communication.' Bombs result in death and destruction. — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
When we came to Iraq, we didn't understand the complexity - what it meant for a society to live under a brutal dictatorship with… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
I think any of us who have been involved in the mission of Iraq have developed a great deal of affection for the Iraqi… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Because war is a competition involving life and death, and in which national security and vital interests are at stake, establishing an objective other… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would like it to be and, by doing so,… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
