What we have found is that we were the principal mediators in many cases between the Iraqis and their own security forces… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Much of the conventional wisdom associated with Vietnam was highly inaccurate. Far from an inevitable result of the imperative to contain communism, the war… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
We confuse activity with progress, and that's always dangerous, especially in war. — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
What is certain about the future is that even the best efforts to predict the conditions of future war will prove erroneous. What is… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
We often operate effectively on the physical battleground but not on the psychological battleground. We fail to communicate our resolve. — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Consequences of linear thinking in Afghanistan and Iraq included overestimating indigenous forces' capabilities, underestimating the enemy, and the associated expectation that the coalition could… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Bombing, particularly from the perspective of the receiving end, is not 'communication.' Bombs result in death and destruction. — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
When we came to Iraq, we didn't understand the complexity - what it meant for a society to live under a brutal dictatorship with… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
I think any of us who have been involved in the mission of Iraq have developed a great deal of affection for the Iraqi… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
Because war is a competition involving life and death, and in which national security and vital interests are at stake, establishing an objective other… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would like it to be and, by doing so,… — H. R. McMaster Copy Share Image
