What we need to do, however, is figure out what our best available theories of the mind suggest about epistemological issues, while we recognise that we may need to change our views on these questions as new evidence comes in. — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share Image
I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
The role of empirical work in informing our philosophical theories, as I see it, is not that it gives us a better view of… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
The fact that we have been able to develop a successful science, which issues in ever more accurate predictions and broader explanations, is the… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
When I got to college, I planned to be a math major, and, in addition to signing up for some math courses, I decided… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined. — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
What we need to do, however, is figure out what our best available theories of the mind suggest about epistemological issues, while we recognise… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
I largely defer to the cognitive ethologists. I believe that the arguments that they make on this score are extremely persuasive. More than this,… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
Rather, although belief may be adequate for explaining the behavior of individual animals - an animal which believes that p will behave no differently… — Hilary Kornblith Copy Share
